The 1962 War between India and China

Relevant because similar situation obtains now

This is the story of the 1962 Indo-China war. It is the most important event of India’s post independence history, and equally, the least well known. It has been so shameful an event for India and Indian army, that very precise efforts have been undertaken to hide it from public gaze. That must be undone.

I’ll cover it only in outline, focusing on the battle in Tawang sector. I am using Shiv Kunal Verma’s book – 1962 The war that wasn’t – as my source of information.

In 1957, Gen Thimayya, Chief Of Army Staff ( COAS) gave his assessment to the Government about Indian capabilities against China. It said, ‘ I can not, as a soldier, envisage India taking on China in an open conflict on its own.  It must be left to the politicians and diplomats to ensure our security,’ He further advocated that should the Chinese penetrate the Himalayan watershed, lightly equipped mobile commandos should be used to harass their lines of communications, and only after the Chinese had entered the plains, should the army use its full power to defeat them. ‘

This was professional army advice. If the government chose to ignore it, they alone must bear the responsibility.

In Aug 59, the Longju incident took place in which the Chinese attacked the 12 men Assam Rifles post. Since 8 of those men escaped, the media got wind of it and the matter was flashed all over India. Nehru was then forced to face the parliament, where he admitted for the fist time that there were serious differences with the Chinese, who had also occupied Indian territory. He then casually announced that he was now placing the entire area under the army – hitherto under against the Assam Rifles, operating under the Home ministry. So, till 1959 Aug, Indian army was not responsible for the NEFA ( or Ladakh) sector defence. Thimmaya asked Nehru to change his decision, to which he reFused. Three days later,  Menon, defence minister, lashed out at Thimayya for having gone straight to Nehru. Chastised by his own Defence Minister, Thimaaya resigned. Nehru persuaded him to withdraw his resignation, which he did. This greatly weakened him and the army.

Maj Gen Biji Kaul of the ASC (Army Service Corps – not a combat arm), a personal favourite of Nehru, rose in stature. This was the beginning of quasi-political senior officers in the army hierarchy.

After Nehru’s orders for the army to take over the border, 4 Div was tasked for NEFA.

In Mar 60, Eastern army Commander, Lt Gen Thorat, held Ex Lal Qila – a full assessment of the situation. If at all the army was to be responsible for the border with China, he recommended a 3 tier defence – the Thorat plan. First tier was small outposts on McMohan line for watch and observation only ( Like Screens), second tier of delaying positions that would force a battle and possible regrouping for Chinese, and the third tier was the main defensive tier at ground of own choosing where troops will fight from fixed defences.  The third, final tier of Thorat, was to be around Bomdila, which was much South of Tawang and Sela, just North of Tezpur.

This was politically unpalatable, as no one was prepared to lose even an inch of ground. So, Thorat plan was poohpoohed and so was anyone else who approved it. That made it even more possible for Menon to by-pass  the Army Chief and Army Commander and rely more and more on Biji Kaul.

Mallik, IB Chief had written, ‘The main objection of Army that too may tps must not be dply on border because that grnd was not suitable for def and hence of own choosing, was strange. Battles are fought on the border, be they suitable or not.’

It must be emphasized that the Forward policy finally adopted by the army was not Nehru’s Forward Policy. He had said, as late as Nov 60, that, ‘We are to patrol from our present position, as far as possible, towards the IB. This must be done without getting into a clash, unless it becomes necessary in self defence.’ He had added, though, that, ‘Patrolling should be done with a view to establishing our posts that stops the enemy from advancing any further, and also dominating from any post they may have already established,’ K Subramaniam, then a  Jt Secy in MoD, says, ‘the new posts were sited not so much from a tactical point of view but more as observations posts to keep an eye on the Chinese.’ So, it was not so much a ‘Forward policy’, as a ‘continuous surveillance policy.’

So, in a sense, Nehru’s Forward Policy was quite the same as Thorat’s 3 tier defence, or Thimayya’s policy of lightly equipped mobile commandos harassing the lines of communications of Chinese, and only after they entered the plains, should the army use its full power to defeat them. It is the functionaries of the MoD, and partly the army, that changed Nehru’s policy of forward patrolling into fixed forward defences. Nehru laid down the right policy, but his ministers and bureaucrats took it upon the government to also oversee its execution, rather than leave it to the army. The politically-savvy officers of the army jumped on the MoD’s interpretation of it. The much-weakened COAS and Eastern Army Commander, felt helpless to assert themselves (though, in my opinion, they need not have.)

Though Thorat had nominated Bomdi La area as Vital Ground, 4 Div started deploying troops much ahead of it, without any thought to logistics support. The GOC  4 Div was of the Menon-Kaul clique and no one dared stop him. Gen Amrik Singh, GOC 4 Div, defied the Army Cdr. He put more troops ahead of Tawang in fixed positions, echoing the Menon-Kaul tone, with CGS Bogey Sen and COAS remaining silent,

In May 61, Thimayya retired. Pran Thapar takes over. Thapar was distantly related to Nehru through his wife. Thorat too retired. Now Menon and Kaul started discrediting Thimaaya loyalists openly. An enquiry was also constituted against outgoing Chief for treason. Lt gen Verma, GOV XV corps, expected to take over West Comd, got out in exasperation and went to London. Sam Manekshaw, Commandant DSSC, also had enquiry instituted against him.

7 Brigade of 4 Div was ordered  to set up a post at Dhola, on Thagla. Many felt it was not in Indian territory. An Assam Rifle platoon under army officer, was to set up the post in Jun 1962.  Post was 400M short of Thagla ridge. Chinese immediately occupied Thagla and asked the Assam Rifle platoon to withdraw.  The JCO in-charge at Dhola post panicked and reported 600 Chinese amassing. That started the panic on Indian side. The Chinese were only about 60.

At that time, 2 Rajput about to entrain for Mathura. The move was cancelled and unit placed under 7 bde.  Forward move of 7 bde started, against advice of GOC 33 corps.

On 12 Sep, a  conference was held by Minster of Defence Mr Menon. On advice of Lt Gen Bogey Sen,  a decision was taken attack the Chinese at Thagla and clear them by 19 Sep.. This was Op Leghorn. CGS ordered DMO ( Director, Military Operations) to no longer discuss this matter with COAS, but only implement orders without delay. The Intelligence Bureau, under Malik, was fully aware that the few Chinese at Thagla were backed by two full Chinese brigades in depth area, but chose to hide this fact.

9 Punjab of 7 brigade was ordered to attack, Brigade Commander, Dalvi countermanded orders and prepared an appreciation of the situation.  Lt Gen Umrao, Corps commander supported him and hence was seen as ‘dragging feet,’ . He had to be removed without much public outrage. Plan was hatched – Keep 33 corps under Umrao Singh only for Sikkim, Nagaland and E Pak, and introduce new HQ for Kameng in NEFA. This was to be IV corps at Tezpur under Biji Kaul.

Kaul was not told what IB and MO directorate knew – that the chinses had 2-3  bdes backing their unit at Thagla. This was criminal negligence. 

On 9 Oct, Kaul held a conference. He disclosed that instead of attacking Thagla frontally, 2 Rajput was to occupy Yumtso La, as yet unoccupied, to the West of Thagla. This, as per Kaul, was ‘positional defence’. From there 2 Rajput would attack and clear Chinese. A patrol of  9 Punjab was to move ahead of them. When it was pointed out to Kaul that there was no artillery support, he famously said,  ‘Determined infantry do not need artillery support.’

10 Oct ( just one day after conf), the Patrol of 9 Punjab crossed Namka Chu and 2 Rajputs were following, still this side of Namka Chu. Chinese artillry opened up om the 9 Punjab patrol. Then they started attacking the 9 Punjab patrol which was across the Namka Chu, but were beaten back.

Kaul was severely rattled and said he was leaving for Delhi to apprise PM. Al because a patrol was attacked! But before he lefe, he ordered troops to hold present position  - S of Namka Chu – at all costs. Not a single inch was to be given up, regardless of cost. 9 Punjab patrol pulled back this side of Namka Chu, after losing 9 men. 2 Rajput was strung out linearly, all along Namka Chu, dominating the log bridges on it.

No action till 19 Oct. 2 Rajput, strung along Namka Chu, had 9 days of preparation before the attack came on 20 Oct.

Chinese plan was to make a frontal attack at centre to pin down the Rajputs, while infiltrating columns ( from the night before ) would attack from flanks and rear, thus tacking platoons piecemeal, from all directions. It is noteworthy that the companies and platoons of 2 Rajput were strung along the Namka Chu, and were not in mutual support of each other, as tactics demands.

Meanwhile, Kaul did meet the PM in Delhi on 10 Oct and advised a pull back from Namka Chu. But now the new COAS ( Pran Thapar) and Bogey Sen (Army Cdr) opposed him. The PM agreed with the COAS. Kaul returned to Tezpur. Menon, Thapar and Sen also converged at Tezpur. 18 Oct, Kaul fell ill and moved back to Delhi. But his orders ‘to not lose an inch’ held, even while he was in his bed in Delhi.

Last letter of one Capt Mangat, ‘The Chinese hold the high ground, and seem to be in great str. Should they attack, we wil defend our territory to our very last breath. It is very cold here and we do not have snow clo, but we will give the Chinese a hot rxn if they dare to attack. But I wish we were better prepared.’

The Chinese had started infiltrating on Ni 18 Oct. Numerous parties had move behing 2 Rajput and 1/9 GR. En arty opened up 4.30 am

Companies anticipated a frontal assault but found enemy attacking them from the rear. Coy Cdr C coy, Maj Sethi was nowhere to be seen. C coy was wiped out – from the rear. All coys were attacked from the rear – and then the Bn HQ. CO was wounded and captured. Last to fall was the A Coy of 2 Rajput. The AR men of Dhola just melted away.

2 Rajput – 513 strong – had 282 killed, incl 4 officer and 7 JCOs, 81 men, incl 2 officer and 3 JCOs were wounded and taken prisoner. 90 others were taken prisoner, unwounded. 60, mostly of A Coy, under coy cdr, Capt Aipe, got away.

All in just 3 hours.

Every one knew that the Chinese were  preparing to attack them, in that unsound tactical position. But neither the GOC, nor the brigade commander, or, I may add (word os Shiv Kunal Verma in his book – dittoed by me), the COs of  2 Rajput, 9 Punjab, 1/9 GR took the initiative to redeploy the sub units in a more tactically sound position. ‘For 9 days, none of the commanders showed an iota of common sense, preferring instead to complain about their helplessness,’ This is despite, ‘every man in the formation knew that the Rajput position on the Namka Chu were death traps,’

On his failure to countermand, or modify, orders and pull back 2 Rajput back higher defensible heights, Dalvi, Commander 7 brigade, was to later write, ‘ I should not have accepted the order to defend the bridges at all costs, but then it takes more courage to appear a coward then risk being killed.’

1/9 GR took casualties, then decided to withdraw from Tsangdhar, which was also location of 7 brigade.  Wounded CO was making retreat slow, so was left behind with water and one jawan – for medical aid by Chinese. CO being left behind by unit is an outright disgrace to any military unit in the world.  9 Punjab and 4 Grenadiers (other than one coy), withdrew without being seriously engaged by the enemy. Both units had left their prepared positions and withdrew, as Hq 4 Div had ordered them to, at about 11 am. COs of both units abandoned their units and made good their way out of the danger zone, to Assam plains, through Bhutan. This too is unbelievable, but is true.

This is an account by 2 Lt AS Behl of 17 Para  Field artillery, which had arrived in location only on 8 Oct. He was at Tsangdhar, near the Brigade Headquarter location.  When the panic withdrawal startedrfrom Tsangdhar, he reports, ‘ Some people were yelling at us to keep firing and keep they enemy at bay (while they withdrew).’ Surprisingly, some oficers who passed that way did not even ask that young boy if he needed any help. ‘All they wanted from him was to keep firing at the Chinese, so they don’t follow them (those who were running away. ‘I felt ashamed of them who were running away and proud of my troops who wanted to fight it out at the gun position,’

By 3 pm on 20 Oct, within 10 hours of the start of the fight, 7 brigade disintegrated as a formation. Wherever the officers and JCOs had stood their ground, the men responded superbly. Where the officers withdrew, whatever the reasons, the men upstuck.

Threat was now developing on Tawang. Tawang was to be approached from North via Bum La. When the enemy attacked Bum La, army ordered withdrawal of Tawang – its Vital Ground. Even in their wildest dreams, Chinese would not have anticipated that the Indians would run away so easily. In their war records, the Chinese wrote, ‘Indian forces at Tawang were panic-stricken, like birds rattled by the mere twang of a bow string.’ Indeed. They were right. Tawang, which had been stocked and prepared for over a year – the best prepared position in that area- was abandoned without a shot being fired.

The question now was – where to stand next? Sela or Bomdi la? Initially, Orders were issued to hold defensive position all the way back at Bomdi La, then changed to Sela – between Tawang and Bomdi La.

At this point, we should also look at what was happening in other sectors where the Chinese had attacked.

In the extreme East of NEFA, Aat the tri-junc of India, China and Burma, the Chinese had attacked Kibithu and pushed the Indians back to Walong. Walong was also vacated, just when attacked. Biji Kaul’s orders to Brig Rawley there was typical of his ambiguous style, ‘Hold on to your present position to the best of your ability. If it becomes untenable, take up an alternative position and hold it to the best of your ability. In the event of that to becoming untenable, you are to take up a series of layback positions and delay the enemy.’ 

In Ladakh, Chinese had attacked Daulat Beg Oldi, Chip-chap and Galwan, almost along with the attack at Namka Chu on 20 Oct. Indian posts, held by platoon, or even a section, were taken one by one by the Chinese.  By 23 Oct Indian troops at Srijap, on the Northern banks of Pangong-Tso, were under fire and the entire sector from Chushul to Demchok was threatened.

Let us now get back to  Tawang sectror. Chinese attacked Sela from several directions, as they did everywhere else. In a couple of hours, three inf units had been destroyed owing to complete confusion and indecision at the top. Chinese  outflanked Sela. IV Corps ordered withdrawal from Sela, which was held by 12000 trrops. Then they cancelled the order, and ordered, ‘4 Div to remain at Sela and fight it out to the best of its ability, and with draw only if the position becomes untenable.’ But 4 Div panicked and pulled out after a brief  encounter. Palit had to say, on 18 Nov, ‘4 inf Div has pulled out without orders and without offering  battle. Sometime between midnight and this morning, our forces ran away from Sela, Senge and Dirang. They seem to have abandoned al their wireless sets as there has been no further contact with any formation or unit thereafter.’

The next position was  Bomdila.

Soon, the Chinese attacked Bomdila, which fell fast.

The 4^th Indian Div. Read Eagles, that had created an aura of invincibility about them in North Africa, had ceased to exist within 36 hours of Chinese attack on Sela.

On 19 Nov, Chinese were attacking the outskirts of Tenga. As soon as it started, Indian trs withdrew haphazardly.

On 21 Nov, the Chinese declared a unilateral ceasefire.

Indian troops vacated areas North of Brahamputra, causing a mass panic among civilians.

Gen Pran Thapar, COAS, resigned.

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It is important to know these facts since the situation now is closest to what was obtaining in 1962.

·       An inept but image-sensitive political leadership.

·       Very strong political leaders, practically with no opposition.

·       Highly politicized top brass of army.

·       Powerful but unaccountable, bureaucracy and its rhetoric of ‘We won’t yield even an inch of our beloved motherland.’

·       Chinese desire to teach India a lesson.

·       Unclear border between India and China.

• Unclear and ambiguous tasking by senior politicians e.g Def Minister Rajnath Singh, reportedly telling COAS Naravane ( as per advance version of Naravan’e forthcoming book) to ‘Do as you think fit’, when Naravane queried him on government policy on opening fire on advancing Chinese tanks at Sothern bank of Pangong Tso.